APPENDIX II.

(1) Board's letter to Stringer Lawrence and Robert Palk, May 11, 1753.[1]

"Major Lawrence having advised us that the King of Tanjour has offered to act as a mediator to reconcile the difference between the Nabob and Mysore King and as we are of opinion such a reconciliation is absolutely necessary to our own as well as the Nabob's affairs, we desire you will endeavour to cultivate it, hereby giving you full power and authority to do the same and desiring you would do it upon the best terms you can. The following if to be got would be the most advantageous.

It is evident that the Mysore King's demand will be Trichinopoly, if it should be so, that if it be agreed to be delivered, it be on a limited time on conditions:

That the Morattas be drawn off the French.

That the Mysore King and Moratta shall endeavour to settle the Nabob in the Province.

That the Mysore King pay such a sum of money to the Nabob and if possible that the debt to us which is large, be secured.

That the King of Tanjore be included in this Treaty and the Mysore King not to molest him or his country.

That we do not appear as Principal in this affair, our troops may evacuate the place and at the time appointed.

That you endeavour to prevent the Nabob's entering into engagements prejudicial to us ...."

(2) Board's letter to Thomas Cooke, September 12, 1753.[2]

"Being determined by all possible means to promote a reconciliation between the Nabob and Dalloway though

1. *Fort St. George Records*: *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1753), p. 77.
2. *Ibid*, pp. 149-150.

Messrs. Lawrence and Palk advised us they found it impossible to effect anything, yet we are come to a resolution to make a further trial and have fixed on you for this Commission, you will therefore proceed to camp with expedition visiting the King of Tanjore on your way ....

We give you full powers to confer with the Nabob concerning the necessary steps to be taken to conclude a peace and to do the same with the Daloway ... We think it necessary to tell you what has already passed and our sentiment thereon.

The Daloway has seemed averse to treat in camp, possibly intimidated by the French or thinking their knowledge of it might be of disservice to him, but on conversing with his Vakeel here, he expressed a strong desire for it and has since acquainted the President that he had the Daloway's orders to propose either being paid the money he advanced or being put in possession of Trichenopoly and if the latter, he would draw off the Moratta from the French, who with himself were to join the Nabob, settle him in the Arcot province, enter into a strict alliance with him and further would pay him a considerable sum of money and that he would also enter into a friendly alliance with the King of Tanjour.

The Nabob, though the situation of his affairs has been frequently laid before him and [on account of] our inability to support the expense, evades as much as possible coming to the point and wrote the President that he gave him a power to settle affairs with the Daloway and offer the districts belonging to Trichinopoly but not the Fort till the money be paid. We are of opinion these are terms the other will not accept but that with Trichinopoly he would be satisfied and in return grant the Nabob several advantages, though nothing ought to be left to his generosity.

If contrary to expectation the Daloway could be brought to accept a mortgage of the districts belonging to Trichinopoly as a security for the payment of a certain sum to be settled and agreed on in full satisfaction of all his demands on the Nabob and thereupon consent and engage to draw off the Moratta from the French and return to their respective countries, we recommend to you the perfecting such an accommodation, but if he is to be satisfied with anything less than Trichinopoly, the terms on which the cession of that place may be consented to, are these:

(i) that he renounce his agreement with the French and enter into an alliance with the Nabob to settle him in his government,

(ii) that he draw off the Moratta from the French and engage him to enter into an alliance with the Nabob to settle him in his government,

(iii) that he defray at his own proper expense the whole charge of the Mysore and Moratta troops,

(iv) that the payment of the Nabob's debt to the Company be secured and that such a further sum as the parties may agree on, be paid by the Daloway to the Nabob.

(v) that the English, King of Tanjour and Tondaman be included in this alliance and act as guarantees for the performance of the treaty which must be signed by the contracting parties and if either of them shall at any time infringe it, he is to be deemed an enemy by all the rest,

(vi) that all the parties do jointly use their influence to promote a peace with the French,

(vii) that if either of the parties be attacked, the rest shall support him, the party attacked defraying all charges,

(viii) that until the Daloway shall have fulfilled whatever is hereinbefore stipulated to be done by him,

the Fort of Trichinopoly shall be garrisoned by English troops, but so soon as the Nabob shall be peaceably settled in the Arcot government and the Daloway shall have accomplished what is before stipulated on his part to be performed, the English troops shall then evacuate the said fort and put the troops of the Mysore King in full and quiet possession of the same."

(3). SUMMARY OF THE NAWAB'S LETTER TO THE GOVERNOR OF MADRAS, OCTOBER 20, 1753.[3]

"The letter from the Nabob empowers the President to make peace with the Daloway on either of the following terms, *viz* :—

(i) That the Mysoreans be allowed what money they advanced the Nabob, Moraree and Tondaman until the death of Chunda, together with five lakhs of Rupees for the Dalloway's charges to that time and that Tinnevelly and Madura countries may be mortgaged as a security for the payment.

(ii) Should the Mysoreans demand the whole sum they have hitherto expended, it may be objected that they have put the *circar* to a very great expense and ruined the country, notwithstanding which the said Tinnevelly and Madura countries may be made over as aforesaid.

(iii) If this should be rejected, the whole Trichinopoly country except the Fort, may be mortgaged to him till their money be paid, provided they expell Morarow and enter into an alliance offensive and defensive with him, the Nabob, and assist him in settling the Arcot country.

(iv) In case a peace cannot be effected on these terms and the Mysoreans insist on the *Fort*, he (the Nabob) is obliged to agree to it, in which case they

8. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1753), p. 182. For details of the letter, see *Count. Corres.* (1753), pp. 130-131, No. 242.

formerly promised him a sum of money and a good fort and fruitful country producing two lakhs of Chakrams in any part of the country he might choose, to enter into an alliance and act with him in punishing the French and to expel Moraree and settle the Arcot province, these terms must therefore be demanded and in regard to the sum of money to be paid by the Mysoreans, the whole amount of what has been advanced by the Company besides 15 lakhs of Rupees must be insisted on."

(4) A REPRESENTATION OF VENKATA RAO (MYSORE VAKIL), TO THE PRESIDENT *re* HIS PROPOSALS FOR AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE NAWAB, *c.* MARCH 1754.[4]

"In regard to the money the whole expense we have been at in paying our army, Morarey's troops and the Nabob together with what has been paid to Tondaman, Torayore, etc., Pallegars, including the sum laid out to draw off or disband the people in Chenda's army as also what has been paid to the French at Pondicherry and likewise the sum laid out to entertain forces and to pay the batta and to give presents, etc., should be accounted from the time we began to assist on the arrival of the Nabob's letter to this day and the payment to be ordered in ready specie upon the Savacars. Unless it is complete with this, they, meaning his masters, will never agree to receive the money upon the mortgage of the country, but on the contrary they will agree to receive the Fort and the country and to order the payment of the Company's money which had been advanced to this day on account of the affair of Trichinopoly as may appear reasonable on their declaring it with an oath to be paid them after the delivery of the

4. *Fort St. George Records*: *Count. Corres.* (1754), pp. 65-66, No. 109.

Fort and the country as per the limited time, together with ten lakhs of rupees to the Nabob according to the agreement as also two lakhs worth of the country including a fort. Should every one act against our government, you should send a force to assist us. We shall on our part send our forces to assist in your affairs and those of the Nabob, with sincerity. We shall not harbour a friendship with the French and your adversaries. You should observe the same with respect to our own. We shall be sincere to you in every respect. You should do the same on your part. We shall carry on or send our traffic and merchandize only to the English ports but they shall not be sent into any other hatman's ports nor shall we permit any other hatmen to settle any factory or trade in the country. Agreeable to the foregoing, an agreement shall be drawn out and sealed with the King's seal with an oath prescribed by our religion and it shall also be signed by the Dallaway. The Merchants' mediation shall likewise be inserted in it as well as the witnesses. You should on your part be mindful of the fort to be delivered according to the agreement or limited time and the money to be received of the sowcars. Should any of the Mogul's subadars (or officers) make an attempt, oppose or plead any hindrance in the performance of the above agreement, you should . . . and deliver the fort according to the limited time and receive the money through the means of the merchants according to the agreement. At present you should assist us with a force to settle Madura, etc., countries on that side. Till the time limited be expired, you should leave only the English guard in the Fort and withdraw the Nabob's people who have no business there. You should give us dividend out of the guns, firelocks, ammunition, elephants, etc., which were seized in Chanda's army. In case of traffic from our government, you should not suffer any hindrance but on the contrary you should use us

respectfully. We shall never fail in this agreement. You should on your part give a writing or agreement with an oath prescribed in your religion under the Company's seal and the Counsellor's sign and you should insert the mediation as well as the Merchants' attestation."

(5) COUNCIL'S LETTER TO STRINGER LAWRENCE, MARCH 25, 1754.[5]

"Terms proposed by the Council to Mysore through the Vakeels of the Mysore King:

(1) That the King of Mysore shall renounce his alliance with the French and enter into an alliance with the Nabob Anaverde Khan to settle him in his government of the Carnateck.

(2) That he draw off Morarow from the French and engage him to enter into an alliance with the Nabob to settle him in his government.

(3) That until this be effected, the King of Mysore shall defray at his own expense the whole charge of the Mysore and Moratta troops.

(4) That the King of Mysore shall secure to the Company the whole debt due to them by Nabob Anaverde Khan to be paid by the Savacars in Madrass on delivery of the Fort of Trichenopoly at the time hereinafter stipulated.

(5) That on delivery of the said fort to the King of Mysore, he shall also pay to the Nabob ten lakhs of Rupees and assign him such a district of the Mysore country with a fort in the same as shall produce annually two lakhs of Rupees.

(6) That the King of Mysore shall grant the English the sole and exclusive privilege of trading in his country and no other Europeans whatever shall be permitted to partake of it.

5. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1754), pp. 77-78.

(7) In consideration of all which Articles to be done and performed by the King of Mysore, the Fort of Trichenopoly shall be delivered over to him within 12 months from the conclusion of this agreement and that on signing the same all the forces and effects of the Nabob Anaverde Khan (provision not included, which is to remain there for the benefit of the King of Mysore) shall be withdrawn and the said fort shall be and remain garrisoned by English troops only until the time stipulated for the delivery thereof.

(8) That a due proportion according to former agreement, of all the cannon and warlike stores taken at Seringham shall be delivered to the King of Mysore at the same time as the Fort.

(9) That the English will guarantee to the King of Mysore the peaceable possession of the said Fort.

(10) That the King of Tanjore if he chooses it, shall be admitted into this alliance and the peaceable possession of his dominions shall be guaranteed to him by all the parties.

(11) That this treaty may be more beneficial to all the parties, *viz.* the English, the Nabob, King of Mysore and King of Tanjore, they do mutually agree to defend each other's possessions against the attacks and attempts of an enemy who may invade the same.

It is possible objections may be started to several particulars in the foregoing Articles but that the treaty may not on that account be protracted for want of sufficient instructions, we shall now give you our thoughts on such as seem the most liable to difficulties :

(i) It is probable the Dalloway may object to the 3rd Article. In that case, as the Nabob's circumstances will not admit of his defraying the charge of the Mysore troops, we see no other way of settling the Article than by stipulating that when the King of Mysore shall be in possession of the Trichenopoly country, he shall retain

the tribute due from that country to the Arcot subah-ship until the debt is paid.

(ii) The payment of the Nabob's whole debt to the Company will, we are afraid, occasion some difficulties as Vencatrow proposes only to pay what has been expended on account of the affairs of Trichinopoly. Indeed last year he offered to pay the whole but then it did not amount to above 25 lakhs; and by the time this treaty may be concluded it will be full 35; this is so material an object to us that it must be insisted on and rather than break off the Treaty, some equivalent may be thought of. Perhaps if the two lakhs' worth of country proposed to be assigned the Nabob were given up, it might conciliate the difference.

(iii) The limited term of one year for the surrender of the Fort, we believe, will be admitted. Vencatrow has intimated as much to the President though he has not inserted it in his memorial. If it should be very strenuously objected to, perhaps the agreeing to admit a small party of Mysoreans into the Fort may obviate the difficulty and we think we cannot be of any prejudice.

These, Sir, are the points that occur to us at present. Others may arise, but if they should not be very essential, such we mean as may effect the general plan, we desire you will not wait for particular orders but conclude on your own judgment. We hereby empower you to do so and when all the Articles are fully agreed on, the Treaty must be ratified by us under the Company's seal, and by the Nabob, King of Mysore and King of Tanjore under their respective chips....."

(6) THE REVISED PROPOSALS OF VENKATA RAO *re* AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE NAWAB, MAY 13, 1754.[6]

"Proposals made by Venkat Rao, the King of Mysore's Vakeel, to the Hon. Thomas Saunders, Esq.,

6. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1754), pp. 104-105.

President and Governor of Fort St. George, acting as mediator between the said King of Mysore and Nabob Anaverdy Khan Bahadur.

(1) The King of Mayasore (Mysore) proposes to draw off all his forces and return to his own country and not molest the Nabob on condition that he be paid the whole expence he has been at in paying his army, Morari Row's troops and on account of the Nabob together with what has been paid to Tondaman, Torayore and Polligars including the sum laid out to draw off or disband the people in Chunda's army as also what has been paid to the French at Pondicherry and likewise the sum laid out to entertain forces and for *Batta* and presents to be accounted from the time the King first began to assist the Nabob on the receipt of his letter to the day of concluding this agreement, the said sum to be paid in ready specie or secured by the *savacars* but the mortgage of the country will not on any account be accepted [Note the similarity of this part of the document with the earlier portion of Appendix II-(4)]. If this proposal should not be accepted, in that case, the King of Mayasore proposes the following terms:—

(2) The King of Mayasore will consent to renounce his alliance with the French and enter into an alliance with Nabob Anaverdy Khan Bahadur to settle him in the Arcot Government.

(3) The King of Mayasore promises that he will draw off Morari Row from the French and send him away to his country and that he shall not join the French and act against the Nabob.

(4) The King of Mayasore promises to defray at his own cost and charges, the expences of his troops that shall be employed in the Nabob's service.

(5) If the King of Tanjore will accede to the Treaty, the King of Mayasore in that case promises to enter into

a defensive alliance with him, that is to say, if the King of Tanjore will guarantee unto the King of Mayasore the peaceable possession of Trichinopoly Fort and the country. The King of Mayasore will on his part engage to assist the King of Tanjore to the utmost of his power in defending his dominions against all his enemies and will upon no account molest his country.

(6) The King of Mayasore promises that on the delivery of the said Fort to him or his officers, he will pay unto the Nabob Anaverde Khan 10 lakhs of Rupees and assign to him in possession of such a district in the Mayasore country with a fort in the same as shall produce annually 2 lakhs of Gopal Chakrams.

(7) The King of Mayasore agrees to pay the English East India Company, the debt due to them by the Nabob on account of the expenses defrayed from the time they began to assist in the affairs of Trichinopoly to the time of making this treaty, as may appear reasonable by an oath or cause the same to be secured by the *Savacars* in Madars, to be paid on the delivery of the Fort of Trichinopoly at the time and manner hereafter stipulated.

(8) The King of Mayasore promises to grant to the English the sole and exclusive privilege of trading in his country and no other Europeans whatsoever shall be permitted to partake of it.

(9) In consideration whereof the King of Mayasore demands that the Fort of Trichinopoly be delivered in his possession within 12 months to be reckoned from the day this treaty shall be concluded, he paying the usual tribute to the Arcot Subahship from the time of the delivery of the Fort but in the interim, if he collects any part of the rents of Trichinopoly country, he is to pay the said tribute in proportion.

(10) From the day of the conclusion of this treaty until the expiration of the said 12 months (unless all the

parties should consent to deliver up the Fort sooner), the King of Mayasore will agree that the said Fort be garrisoned by the English troops only and all the Nabob's people, except one killedar and attendants, shall immediately evacuate the said Fort and the King of Mayasore requires that he shall be at liberty to have an officer in the said Fort in token of his right to the same.

(11). All provisions, cannon, mortars, etc., relating to the Fort at the expiration of the said 12 months shall belong to the King of Mayasore, but not the warlike stores, cannon, mortars, etc., which may belong to the field or the English.

(12) The King of Mayasore demands that a due proportion of all the cannon and warlike stores, etc., taken at Srirangam shall be delivered to him at the same time as the Fort, but in case all the said cannon, warlike stores, etc., should not be then in being, in such a case a due proportion of what shall be in being shall be delivered him and a just equivalent in money for what shall have been expended.

(13) The King of Mayasore demands that the peaceable possession of the said Fort and country shall be guaranteed to him by the English against all persons who shall invade or molest the same and that the English as mediators shall not refuse the delivering of the said Fort on pretence of orders from court, he paying the usual tribute.

(14) The king of Mayasore also requires that as he assists Nabob Anaverdy Khan in settling him in the Arcot Government, the English shall assist in settling the King in the peaceable possession of Madura and Tinnevelly countries, he paying the expence of the English troops which may be sent upon that business, together with the cost of the Ammunition, etc., as also all other charges as may be necessary and likewise he is to defray the charges of the English garrison (which may

be left in the Fort) during their stay there, together with the cost of the Ammunition, etc, as may be necessary for their use.

(15) That the King of Mayasore shall not molest Tondamon, the said Tondamon paying to him as accustomary under Anaverdy Khan Bahadur and will on no account demand more or molest him.

(16) The agreement shall be signed, sealed and guaranteed by the contracting parties and whosoever shall infringe this treaty, shall be deemed as an enemy by the rest who agree to assist the injured party in giving him a just satisfaction. The Nabob, the King of Mayasore, the King of Tanjore and the English mutually agree to yield their assistance to each other in case of an attack by the enemy.

Memorandum.—In regard to the 3rd Article, Venkat Rao says that the Dalloway will consent so far as to send away Morari Row to his country, but if the French endeavour afterwards to send for him from his country to join them, he doubts whether the Dalloway will consent to prevent him from so doing; he is, however, of opinion that if he once returns to his country the French will not easily get him back again. In regard to the 7th Article, which mentions the Company's debt, Venkat Rao is of opinion that the Dallaway will ask the amount of the Company's debt, but it being explained to him that it is impossible to say exactly how much it is, as the disbursements and charges at Fort St. David, Devecotah and camp for a considerable time past have not been brought to account, here, he then desired it might be guessed at within 2 or 3 lakhs more or less, upon which he was told it might amount to between 30 and 35 lakhs, which he said he believed the Dalloway would consent to pay. In regard to the months, Venkata Row says that that Dalloway will desire a shorter term but being told this was the very basis of the treaty and could not be

dispensed with and that the Dalloway might look on the promise of the English to deliver it then as most sacred, he said he did not doubt but he could prevail on the Dalloway to consent to it.

Agreed that a copy of the foregoing proposals be sent to Major Lawrence and that he be desired to communicate the same to the Dalloway as soon as possible, as it is of great consequence that this affair should not remain in suspence and thereby prevent the pursuit of some other plan but be brought to a conclusion or dropt without delay."

(7) A Note on M. Bussy, 1720-1785.

Mons. Counte de Bussy, who took part in Salābat Jang's expedition to Mysore (1755), was a distinguished French diplomat of the 18th century. The story of his life and work has been told recently by Prof. Alfred Martineau in his work "Bussy et l' Inde Francaise," Bussy and French India, pubished in French at Paris (1935). "Nurtured in the traditions of Dupleix, besides being a friend and contemporary of both Dupleix and Lally, though at variance with both of them," he was, we note, "destined to see the beginning of the end of French domination over India, an end signified by his own recall." The following note relating to the details of his career in general and his connection with the politics of Mysore (1755) in particular would be found interesting.[7]

Charles Joseph Patissier, known later as the Marquis of Bussy and Castelnau, was born at Ancienville, in the

7. Based mainly on *Bussy in the Deccan.*—Being extracts from "Bussy and French India," in French, by Prof. A. Martineau. Translated by Dr. Miss A. Cammiade (Pondicherry, 1941), pp. ii & 306. Also works of Grant-Duff, *o.c.*, I. 451, 454-5, 460, 462-3, 477, 485-9, 494-500, 502; Orme, *Indostan*, II. Bk. IX. 845; Malleson, *Dupleix* (Rulers of India Series), 87, 93-96, 140, 162-3, 180-3; Hill, *Yusuf Khan*, 39, 83-84 125-126, etc. See also *f. n.* 17 just at page 711.

Mons. De Bussy.

province of Aisne, in France, February 8, 1720.[8] Born of a small lord who possessed no other wealth than his sword and of a mother who belonged to a still lower rank, he held a lieutenancy under his father (1733), on whose death in 1735, he resided in the Islands of France and Bourbon, down to 1740. He arrived in India in 1741 and took part in La Bourdannais' siege of Madras, 1746. In 1748, he was among the garrison which defended Pondicherry against Boscawen's attack. He distinguished himself at Āmbūr (1749) and took part in the siege of Tanjore under Goupil, his first daring exploit being the capture by night of the invincible rock-fortress of Gingee in 1750, with D' Auteuil as his second in command. Orme gives a graphic account of the capture which helped to establish the reputation of French arms in South India, which stood Dupleix in good stead in his long struggle with the English. When, in 1751, Muzaffar Jang became Nizām on the death of Nāsir Jang, Bussy, accompanied by his Dewan Abdul Rahiman, better known by the title of Haidar Jang, escorted him (Muzaffar) to Aurangabad, then the capital of the Deccan. On Muzaffar's death, the same year, Bussy with a French corps helped Salābat Jang in his advance towards Hyderabad and made him Nizām entirely through his influence.

At this juncture, Pēshwa Bālāji Rao from Poona proceeded from Aurangabad, on a projected invasion of the Deccan, and levied contributions wherever Salābat Jang's authority was acknowledged. Bussy, who was principal adviser in directing Salābat Jang's army at the head of a battalion of 500 Europeans and a body of 5,000 disciplined sepoys, recommended, as the best means of repelling these aggressions, that the war should be

8. This corrects Vincent Smith's statement that in 1751 Bussy was thirty-five years of age, implying his date of birth in 1716 (see *Oxford History of India*, p. 476, f.n. 2).

carried into the Mahratta country. When Salābat and Bussy advanced on Ahmadnagar, the Pēshwa attacked him at the head of 40,000 horse (by surrounding them). The French artillery of eight or ten field-pieces galled him severely. Thus helped, Salābat advanced towards Poona, totally destroying every village on the route. The Pēshwa opened up negotiations with Salābat and at the same time tried to create dissensions among his (Salābat's) officers in regard to the views of the French. Bussy, as the best means of counteracting such schemes and securing his own influence, exerted himself with judgment and energy. On the 22nd November (1751) he planned an attack of the Mahratta camp, while the Mahratta army fled before him and valuable booty was obtained. The surprise was incomplete, but the Mahrattas sustained very little loss, only one man being wounded. But the attack made a great impression and had the effect of raising his reputation among the Mahrattas. Undaunted, the Mahrattas attacked Salābat Jang and nothing but the French artillery prevented a total defeat. Salābat Jang returned to Ahmadnagar to replenish, constanly harassed by the Mahrattas. Salābat's short-lived ardour abated on hearing of Raghuji Bhonsle's movements to the eastward. His difficulties on the road; the clamour of the troops for arrears of pay; and discontent among his officers made him to accept Bussy's advice to close up with the Pēshwa's overtures, An armistice was concluded and Salābat Jang returned to Hyderabad. But disaffection among his troops was so great that Raghunath Dass, the Dewan, was assassinated on 7th April 1752, in a tumult created by the soldiery for arrears of pay.[9]

Bussy now became the chief adviser and guide of the newly created Nizām and through him secured French

9. *Vide*, On the Nizām-Pēshwa Relations (1751), Grant-Duff, *o,c.*, I. 454-456.

ascendency at Hyderabad. As the virtual master of the Deccan, he got confirmed all the grants made by Muzaffar Jang and brought under French control all the territory lying between the Krishna and Cape Comorin. In 1753 he obtained the assignment of the revenue of the Northern Circars (represented by the present districts of Guntūr, Gōdāvari, Kistna, Vizagapatam and Ganjām of the Madras Presidency) for meeting the cost of maintaining French troops in the Deccan.[10] Bussy not only supported his troops from the revenue he collected but also supplied funds to Dupleix for the prosecution of his ambitious schemes. To the Nizām he was faithful; he took part in Salābat Jang's fiscal expedition to Mysore (1755) and fought for him and defeated in his interest the Nawāb of Savaṇūr, 1756. Through the jealousy and intrigues of his enemies, he was ordered, in 1756, to leave the Nizām's territory and proceeded to the east coast. He, however, soon regained his supremacy and reduced Bobbili after a memorable attack. His fame and prowess spread far and wide. Suraja-daula, the Nawāb Nāzim of Murshidabad, applied to him for help in 1757, but he refused it. He seized Vizagapatam and other fortresses besides Daulatabad for his master, the Nizām. In May 1758, he returned to the Deccan just in time to be suspected of complicity in the murder of Shah Nawāz Khān, minister of Salābat Jang, in retaliation for that of Haidar Jang, Bussy's Dewan.[11] On July 18 of the same year, at the end of

10. Wilks (*o. c.*, I. 375) styles it in "absolute cession," which seems not quite correct. See Roberts' *History of India to the End of the E. I. Co.*, in *Historical Geography of the British Dependencies*, p. 111. There does not appear to have been any unconditional grant of the territory, its revenue being assigned for the maintenance of Bussy's troops "so long as they were in the service of the Subadar." As Vincent Smith points out, while Bussy retained power, the practical result was the same (see Smith, o. c., 477, f. n. 1).

11. Grant-Duff adversely remarks that "Bussy, if he found it inconvenient to replace him (Shah Nawāz Khān) in the ministry, had not even the

the seventh year of his office at Hyderabad, when he was at the zenith of his power, Bussy was recalled by Lally, the French Governor-General at Pondicherry, and the ascendency he had built up by his great skill for his nation, was lost for ever.

Bussy acted as second brigadier during the siege of Madras and took part in the battle of Wandiwash, in which Sir Eyre Coote defeated Lally and took Bussy prisoner, January 22, 1760. Bussy was despatched to England but the ship which carried him being captured by a French man-o'-war, landed at Brest, March 9, 1761. In May, he married a cousin of Choiseul, the French minister; and soon exculpated himself of all the charges of venality and corruption brought against him by Lally. In 1765, he married Marie Charlotte Justine de Messey, his first wife having died on 5th March 1764. Retiring to his estates of Castelnau, he was, in 1777, invited to express his ideas about French intervention in India during the war of the North American Independence. He gave his opinion in a memorandum entitled "Reflections on Indian Affairs." Appointed to the conduct of military and diplomatic relations against the English in India, he left Paris, November 13, 1781, and was landed with French troops by Admiral Suffrein, to reinforce Cuddalore (then besieged by the English), on 16th March 1783, three months after Haidar Alī's death. Peace between France and England having been declared about this time, hostilities ceased in India and Bussy withdrew the French troops from the support of Tipū. He expressed

excuse of necessity for stooping to duplicity" and that "his conduct became entangled in the tricks and intrigue which true wisdom despises," thus tacitly hinting at Bussy's complicity in the murder (Grant-Duff, o. *c.*, I. 498). Malleson hardly touches on the subject; Prof. Martineau glosses over Bussy's conduct by merely adding that Shah Nawāz Khān "being accused of having instigated the murder of Haidar Jang, was massacred along with his son, before Bussy had time to reach him" (Martineau, o. *c.*, 281).

his thoughts on the future of the French in India, in a letter written to the minister Mons. de Castries, September 28, 1783, and in another dated 4th August 1784. Like many others of his time, he is said to have made a large fortune for himself; so fast, indeed, was the process in his case that he is said "in the course of a year to have passed from poverty to opulence." He died at Pondicherry, on January 7, 1785, in his sixty-fifth year, from an attack of gout. He had no issue by either of his wives.[12]

Bussy had greater political prescience than even Dupleix. When the "vague and magnificent" title of suzerain of Southern India from the Krishna to Cape Comorin was bestowed on Dupleix, that ambitious man was elated. He even contemplated assuming the title of Nawāb on the death of Chandā Sāhib. Bussy dissuaded him from doing so, for he saw that it would offend the English and make them wholly irreconcilable. Dupleix saw the absurdity of the idea and quickly yielded to the sound advice of Bussy. Bussy's success in the Deccan alarmed the Madras Council and they recalled Col. Heron from his expedition to Madura and Tinnevelly in February 1755. While in the Deccan, Bussy took into his service that extraordinary person M. Marchand, who figures so prominently in the siege of Madura. On the recommendation of M. Dupleix and others, Bussy gave

12. For a brief but vivid account of Bussy in his days of decline at Pondicherry, see *Le Vieux Pondicherry* by Miss V. Labernadie, 368-374. This picture of the distinguished general as an effete, old man immured in his own tent, seeking the pleasures of the table and the harem as an Oriental Nawāb would, instead of answering the clang of the arms, seems, however, distinctly overdrawn to his disadvantage. In any case, it is one that requires more tangible evidence than is furnished by the learned authoress. He was only 65 years of age in 1785. Death claiming him as her own at the moment he was arranging to take over his dear old capital city and he, so victorious in building up France's dominion in India at one time, failing to see the *fleur de lise* flow over any French town in India when he was called away, is a theme for a portrait painter to depict.

Marchand the command of his own body-guard of hussars, an appointment which excited some jealousy, which Bussy never minded.[13]

Bussy was a careful officer. He weighed things before he came to a decision. He warned Lally against his rashness in proceeding in person against Muhammad Yusuf, during the siege of Madras (1758). Yusuf Khān and Capt. Preston had been urged by Lord Pigot to force their way into Madras. Preston, though he was against this apparently useless movement, prepared to obey on the 2nd February. He started at the head of 60 to 80 Europeans, 2,500 sepoys and 1,500 Indian cavalry and four guns. He proposed to cut his way through the enemy at Vepery (now part of Madras City) and thence on to St. Thome. Lally, whose cavalry had been constantly on the alert to meet the raiding parties of Yusuf Khān and Preston, hearing of the intended march, determined to deal with them in person. "In spite of my representations," wrote Bussy to De Leyrit on 14th February 1759, Lally himself marched against them. He then adds: He had nearly 600 Europeans, the *elite* of his army, more than 3,000 sepoys and 2,000 black horse. He was beaten and returned, accusing, according to his custom, his officers of cowardice."[14]

Bussy trained many Indian soldiers in the art of modern European warfare. One of these was Ibrahim Khān Garde, who was at the head of ten thousand artillery and infantry on the side of Sadāśīva Bhao, the commandar of the Mahratta forces at the battle of Panipat, 1761. Elphinstone wrote of Bussy as "the most distinguished of the officers of his nation that ever appeared in India."[15]

13. See Bussy's letter to De Leyrit, dated 25th February 1756. *Bibliotheque Nationale*, N. A. F. 9360, cited in Hill, *o.c.*, 125, f.n. 2.
14. Note to Lally's letter to de Leyrit, 14th February 1759. See *Letters to Bussy*, p. 86, note 2, appended to *Memoire pour le sieur de Bussy*, Paris, 1764, cited in Hill, *o.c.*, 83, f.n. 6.
15. Elphinstone, *History of India*, Ed. Cowel, 1894, p. 729.

Bussy was truly a great man of French colonial history and ranks not so much as a military genius but as a diplomat, who definitely held "that the departure of French (from India) would be followed by the arrival of the English, who would build their greatness on the ruins of the French;" and that "either you must dominate the Asiatic or you must be dominated by him." "He was certainly not superior to Dupleix for his daringness of his plans; but Bussy transcends Dupliex by his judiciousness and by his discernment... If Dupleix was haughty, domineering absolutely in his ideas and obstinate in their realizations, Bussy was a greater master with a more supple mind, knowing better how to adapt himself to circumsmances and drawing his inspiration from them."[16]

With this sketch of the career and character of Mons. de Bussy in the background, we may quote *in extenso* his connection with the politics of Mysore (1755) :—

"After settling all things as well as he could," writes Prof. Martineau,[17] "Bussy had gone back to Hyderabad at the beginning of January (1755) in order to make the necessary arrangements regarding an expedition to Mysore which had been agreed upon long before. According to an old custom, the ruler of Mysore paid his rent to his sovereign lord only after military pressure. Nothing had been paid since the death of Nizam-ul-Mulk, that is to say, since 1748, and the arrears amounted to about 50 lakhs, the annual tribute being about five lakhs.

THE FISCAL EXPEDITION OF MYSORE.

"Both Bussy and Godeheu were not very favourable to the expedition to Mysore. At the time of the

16. Martineau, *Bussy in the Deccan*, Miss Cammiade's translation, 156, 223, 297, 303.

17. *Ibid*, 209-220. We have also had the benefit of translation of this and other portions of Prof. Martineau's book by Rev. Father C. Browne, and Mrs. Adelina de Guiraldes, wife of the famous Argentine poet and novelist Ricardo Guiraldes, now of the Ramakrishna Mutt,—both of Bangalore, to whom our acknowledgments are due.

surrender of Law at Srirangam in 1752, the French had made an agreement with Mysore to conquer Trichinopoly. The armies of both the nations were even then at Srirangam waiting for a favourable opportunity to restart or to push on hostilities. Would it be wise of the French to join in an enterprise which, though not strictly speaking a military one, yet might alienate Mysore and cause it to join their enemies just at a moment when the French were about to encounter great difficulties perhaps with the English? Bussy was too refined a diplomat not to foresee the danger and backed by Godeheu, he at first tried, with all the diplomacy of which he possessed the secret, to dissuade Salabat Jang from this project. But his diplomacy failed for the first time. The Suba was in need of money and necessity caused him to utter words which were not intended to bring joy to Bussy. The prince had a very bad impression of the downfall of Dupleix and as the English took delight in giving out the report that this downfall had been brought about by them, this was a first blow to the French prestige. Later on, towards the end of January, it became known that a conditional agreement, the exact terms of which were not yet revealed, had beed concluded whereby Muhammad Ali was recognised as the Nawab of the Carnatic, leaving aside the eminent rights of the Suba. The French discretion regarding the Mysore campaign led to the belief that either they had lost all authority or that they were traitors to the welfare of the Deccan. The Suba had an explanation with Bussy.

" 'This attitude,' said he, 'must be dictated by your own interests. Is this the return I get for the innumerable benefits with which I have overwhelmed the French? Should I not, on the contrary, expect their greatest eagerness for the welfare of my affairs? How else am I to re-establish my affairs but with this

expedition on which I am resolved? Do you think I have not waited long enough? I have been desprived of my revenues, from the province of Arcot, for the past four years. Owing to my complacency and your arrangements, I do not even know from whom I am to claim my dues. Must I push my complacency still further and abandon the only opportunity I might have of going to Mysore to claim my rights? Oh! this time it is too exacting of me! It seems to me that in this occasion you should strive for my welfare with as much zeal as I have myself taken care of yours.'

"This torrent of words, made more vivid by its tone and by gesture, annihilated Bussy. He had only feeble reasons to oppose these just reproaches. He was resolved to back out and he said that he would have given anything in the world to be exempted from playing such an unpleasant role. He dreaded that if he went too far, he might blast the reputation of uprightness which he had and in which laid all his strength. He would have been exceedingly happy if the matter ended with this first reproach. But the next day the Suba renewed his complaints in full durbar. The whole court shared his feeling of indignation which animated the Suba and looked upon the French nation as a most ungrateful monster. The rumour became general, fear alone kept the word traitor from being uttered. It does not appear as though Bussy had been present at this meeting, but that very day he received the following letter from the Suba:

"'I have understood and pondered over all that you have said and represented to me about our Mysore's expedition. Till now I have relied on the friendship of the French, convinced that they were keen about my interests and as for you, I have considered you as my brother. But all that you say in favour of the Zemindar of Mysore and the round-about way in which you are

trying to dissuade me from going to exact the tribute due to me, lead me to think that I have been mistaken. Every notable man in my army is astonished that you should seem more zealous for the welfare of that Zemindar than for mine. I appeal to your sense of justice. You are fully aware that since five years, out of consideration for your nation, I did not claim the tribute due from the Carnatic. This rich province has now fallen into the hands of my enemies who have deprived me of more than one crore of rupees. The Marathas have despoiled me of one half of my kingdom of Aurengabad and of the greater part of Candesh and Berar. I admit that if it had not been for you, I might have lost the whole of those provinces. Chicacole, Rajamundry, Ellore and Moustafanagar, which the Hyderabad ruler considers as the apple of his eye, have been given for the maintenance of your army, so that you might easily obtain what you need for their upkeep while you were expected to do in return all in your power for my welfare. You know how stranded I am to provide for the sustenance of my army, you have been a witness to the various cabals and revolts which resulted from this. This tribute, due to me by my vassals, is the sole source of revenue left to me. I was not able to raise this tribute during the five years it has taken me to bring order, with your help, throughout the Deccan. The perfidious Zemindars pay in their tribute only when compelled to do so; the Mysore Zemindar has paid nothing for the past six years. When my father and my brother appeared with their armies within his territory, he gave them something like 30 to 40 lakhs. I always intended going to Mysore myself; the opportunity occurred only this year and I find that you are opposed to it. This is what leads me to believe that you are not interested in my welfare. As I get no tribute from the ruler of the Carnatic nor from the Zemindar of Mysore, to what avail is

the French alliance to me? There is nothing else left for me to do but to become a fakir. If you persist in opposing this expedition, give me back Mazulipatam, Divy, Devaracottah, Condavir and the other territories which were given to your nation purely as gifts and also Chicacole, Rajamundry, Ellore and Moustafanagar which were given for the upkeep of your troops; then I will set to work according to my own views and bring back order in this country with whatever help I shall be able to obtain.

"'This comparison which would be made of the French and the English would allow me to fix my choice. The English have helped the meanest of my servants, Muhammad Ali, and have raised him to his present position. If you, who are the allies of the lawful master, allow his affairs to deteriorate, where does your honour stand? You are an intelligent man, think of all that I have said. You have done so much for me, you seemed so attached to all that concerned me that I consider you as a brother' (A. C. C. 286, P. 88-93).

"The whole of this letter was so full of logic that Bussy realized that his situation became daily more and more embarrassing and difficult. He asked instructions from Pondicherry, but Godeheu had just left hurriedly for France (16th February) and the Council of three administrators in charge of the Government, while awaiting the arrival of his successor, Mr. de Leyrit, declared that they did not think they had been empowered to give any orders in the matter. They considered this matter was too delicate for them alone to take a decisive step. Mr. de Leyrit would have to decide it (letter of 21st March).

THE MYSORE EXPEDITION.

"Salabat Jang called out so insistently that his voice dominated everything else. As early as the 2nd March,

Bussy notified to the Council at Pondicherry that the matter could no longer be postponed; the French had to go along to Mysore with Salabat Jang unless they were resolved to lose all they had: the very terms of the agreement, whereby the Circars were ceded to them, obliged them to do so.

"They started a few days later and as it was not strictly speaking a military expedition, they met with no hindrance. The inhabitants were aware that it was the usual way of collecting the taxes, so they withheld from any resistance, lest their own taxes be increased. On the other hand, the troops too refrained from provoking the people or from being hostile to them. Only one tiny fort, along the path, refused victuals and had some shots fired on our troops; within an hour's time, the fort had been silenced and the tributes doubled.

"At first Salabat Jang did not intend to proceed beyond the boundaries of Mysore and resolved to wait there for the tribute to be brought to him, but he was told that Balaji Rao was about to attack Mysore from the north-west in order to get his share of booty. But Bussy, who had secret relations with the Prime Minister of Mysore, made him understand that there was a way to avoid the attack. Since Mysore would have to pay out, whether he wished it or not, it would be better if Salabat Jang himself came up to the walls of Seringapatam where he would appear to the Marathas as the liberator of the country. The question of equitable contribution could then be settled. Things were carried out accordingly and the army set out marching.

"Salabat Jang would have wished to use this opportunity to force the Raja to restitute all the lands and fortresses which he had seized since the death of the Nizam. He wished also the Raja should come in

person to pay his homage as an outward acknowledgment of his subordination. On Bussy's insistence, Salabat Jang agreed to give up these two claims. In the meantime a daughter was born to the Raja; so Salabat Jang, on Bussy's suggestion, was pleased to confer, on that child, the fortress of Ascola and its dependencies, as a Jagir; this represented a gift of two lakhs of rupees. Bussy sent his confidential man, Haidar Jang, to be present at the investiture; the child was placed on the knees of Haidar Jang, while a pearl necklace worth six to seven thousand rupees was put on its neck, in Bussy's name.

"Thus Bussy had attained his double aim, *viz.*, the entente between the French and Mysore had not been broken up and the Marathas had stayed back in their country. There only remained the accounts to be settled between Salabat Jang and the Raja. This was quite easy. The Raja acknowledged being a vassal of the Mogol Emperor whose lieutenant in Southern India the Suba was. The Raja likewise agreed to pay 50 lakhs, of which 12 lakhs were to be paid down cash immediately, and 8 more lakhs within three months; 11 lakhs were to be given in jewels and the balance of 19 lakhs either in assignments or in letters of credit. This arrangement proved satisfactory to all and more especially to the Suba himself, who owed 70 lakhs to his troops. The Mysore contribution was an appreciable amount to him, so that Salabat Jang no longer hesitated to proclaim Bussy's fame with greater vehemence than he had used three months previously to doubt Bussy's fidelity. He wrote on the 21st March to Mr. de Leyrit:

"'All that Mr. de Bussy did during the past five years that he has been beside me is as nothing when compared to what he has done during this last campaign which has been most glorious not only to the French name but also the security and support of my government. I find

no words to express all the praise due to him for all the trouble he has taken and for the careful way in which he reached his ends. I am render obligation to him for the money which has come into my treasury ... All I have, I owe to his bravery while all my happiness is due to the French under his command. Were he ever to leave me, I swear that I will then and there hand over my government to any man who wants to take charge of it and I will retire into some unknown corner. I think of him only as a brother with whom I wish to share the honours of the subadary' (A. C. C. 2, 86 P. 98-101).

" Even the Raja of Mysore aknowledged and sang the praises of Bussy. Towards the end of May he wrote to Bussy that he thanked at Almighty ' for having come with your troops and those of the Mogul, your ally, to settle, through your mediation, all my affairs. So that, although I had incurred some losses previously, I was in a position to satisfy the Moguls. I even swear by God that it is through your help that my life, my country, my honour and even my creed itself have been preserved. I have no friends among Europeans except Frenchmen; my one hope for the future is that you should always continue extending to me the same favour and protection as by the past' (A.C. 3. 86. p. 101-103).

" Mr. de Leyrit had reached Pondicherry in the meantime. Bussy might have thought that he had seen the end of all future worry, if the daily invasion of the Carnatic by the English had not given him cause to think and fear that some day the Deccan too might be undermined by better organised and more powerful cabals than those which had caused him a great deal of anxiety the preceding February.

" *The re-echo of the Mysore affair on the English policy* : The more fortunate than truly glorious Mysore expedition gave the biggest impetus to the policy which the English were to carry out thereafter, in the Carnatic,

though it may not have actually caused it. The conditional treaty drawn up by Saunders and Godehen on the 11th January stated among other terms that both the Companies would not intervene in the quarrels which might occur among the Indian princes and that each one would remain in its respective positions till such time as the two interested nations in Europe had come to some conclusion. But this treaty did not specify Muhammad Ali or any other prince, nor did it fix the positions held by the English or the French troops nor did it give their enumeration. No boundaries were fixed. Therefore there was matter for controversy, but when dealing with adversaries who are more keen on their interests than on truth, every controversy easily turns acrimonious and carries a risk of war.

"When Bussy was marching back light-heartedly with his troops from Seringapatam, little did he think that the English were going to make use of his intervention to claim similar rights in other parts of India. In fact it was the argument which Pigot, the Governor of Madras, put forward shortly after, when the French reproached him for having interfered in the affairs of Madura and Vellore and their excessive entry into those of the Carnatic. Leyrit explained that the two cases were not alike; the reply was that although it might be true that the French had received no payment from Mysore, yet they were being indirectly paid by the Circars. Why should the English not enjoy similar rights to receive subsidies from their allies and lend them a helping hand when necessary? The whole of the Franco-English conflict rests on this ambiguity which took its source at Seringapatam.

"We give below a letter from Pigot, taken at random from among many similar ones, which explains, though it does not justify, the whole of the English policy.

This letter was sent to Leyrit and is dated 1st February 1756 :—

'Please think, Sir, of your various enterprises since the conclusion of the treaty, all of which I have carefully noted. Please think of the amount of money exacted by Mr. de Bussy at the head of a body of French troops, from the Raja of Mysore who certainly was never a vassal of your nation. Please note that you have had troops marched through the territory of Taureour (a little to the north of Trichinopoly) and that you drove away the one who commanded at the time of the truce solely because he had not paid the customary tribute.

'Please remember the various marches undertaken by Mr. de Bussy in the Northern provinces, through territories of princes who undoubtedly were not dependent on him, the contributions he raised on all sides and the unlimited authority he established.

'After thinking seriously on all that I have stated above, please be kind enough to compare the conduct, which we have held since the truce, with that of your nation which had no right whatsoever except that of possessing a day during which you were left free to govern a part of the province in which rights, if any, belonged to the Nawab. We only accompanied the latter when he went to collect the tribute due to him in such parts of the province which were subject to him at the time the peace was concluded' (A. C. C. 2. 91. P. 229).

"The distance between Seringapatam and Hyderabad, as the crow flies, is 550 killometers. The return journey had no incident. On reaching the Krishna they found the river was rising every minute owing to heavy rains in the highlands. The troops did not dare to ford it. Bussy and Salabat Jang sat on the same elephant while the army taking advantage of a slight fall in the river, followed two days later. Hyderabad was reached on the 13th or 14th July."

Comment seems needless. The above passage speaks for itself. The injustice of the expedition, the acknowledgement of its inglorious character, Bussy's personal dislike of it, his hesitation, the false reasoning adopted by Salābat Jang, the fallacious grounds on which the claim was preferred, the handle it gave the English at Madras, all throw a lurid light on the corrupt politics of the period. With Bussy, as with the rest of the politicians and diplomats of the time, the end always justified the means. The embarrassment felt by Bussy vanished when Salābat's pressure became heavy. He, without further trouble of conscience, proceeded to nullify his nation's engagement with Mysore, and to execute the treaty which he himself had concluded with Salābat. The French were by treaty in strict alliance with Mysore; and they found themselves they were also bound by treaty to fight all the battles of Salābat Jang, and consequently to treat as enemies their allies of Mysore. This dilemma was perceived by Bussy, and while credit is due to him for trying to prevent hostility, blame attaches to him for yielding eventually to a course of action which was essentially immoral. He did what he, a man of honor and probity, should not have done. Such are the meshes of diplomacy in which a diplomat may find himself at times when morality is given the go-by. Wilks' defence of Bussy that he felt the embarrassment but that he could not prevent hostilities, sounds like special pleading in the case of a person who should have known what he was about (see Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 385). It would be tantamount to the confession that necessity knows no law. The fact is that Bussy saw he had to use force and he scrupled not to use it. Dēvarājaiya, the Daḷavāi, being, at the time, unable to resist, had to yield and yielded to it, though not without resisting it as much as he could. That is a redeeming feature in his character. He would

not surrender, even if he had to in his exhausted state, without striking a blow for his country.

(8) The Trichinopoly Question, 1755—1761.

The question of the surrender of Trichinopoly to Mysore with a view to recovering the debt due by Nawāb Muhammad Alī Wālājah to the English East India Company, continued to engage the attention of the Court of Directors in London and their Agent and Governor at Fort St. George, Madras, since 1755.

On October 14, 1755 the *Secret Committee* of the Court of Directors, London, thus advised the *Select Committee* of the Governor's Council, Fort St. George, Madras[18]:

"Have received with great pleasure the provisional treaty concluded between Saunders and Godeheu, as it may lead to a definitive treaty; but the present political situation has prevented further negotiations. Meanwhile the Council should try to maintain peace on the Coromandel Coast..... Peace is essential for the recovery of the Nawab's debt. As Trichinopoly is the best security for that debt, it must be secured against either open attack or surprise. Suggest that the negotiations begun between Saunders and the Mysore Vakil for its surrender might lead to an advantageous conclusion, if this could be done without any breach of faith towards the Nawab, the King of Tanjore or any other Indian ally of the Company:"

Again, on February 13, 1756 they directed:[19]

"In view of the strong desire of the King of Mysore to obtain Trichinopoly, we think that its delivery to him to be highly advantageous if thereby his alliance can be secured without injuring the King of Tanjore who has acted as a good friend and ally, and if the Nawab's interests be 'attended to so far as circumstances will admit'

18. *Mad. Des.* (1754-1765), p. 53.
19. *Ibid*, pp. 66-67.

and his whole debt can be thus recovered. The proposals of Venkata Rao, the Mysore Vakil, to Saunders, recorded in Military Consultations, May 13, 1754, seem to offer a good basis for a treaty equally beneficial to the Company, the Nawab and Tanjore. Negotiations should be entered with Mysore on these lines, preferably by Robert Orme, or, if his health will not permit, by some other capable person. But the Commissary is to conclude nothing finally, and his proposals are to be laid before the whole Council for their approval. The utmost secrecy must be observed. Trichinopoly must not be given up without receiving the whole of the Nawab's debt or fully equivalent security. Difficulties may perhaps arise with the Nawab, but every effort must be made to conciliate him, but, if that is impossible, the recovery of his debt and an alliance with Mysore are prime objects, especially when the French may renew war on the Coast. . . "

On November 20, 1756, the *Select Committee* at Fort St. George, reported to the *Secret Committee*: [20]

" Are attempting to negotiate a treaty with the King of Mysore for the recovery of the Company's debt [*Vide* Military Consultations, May 13, 1754, and October 25, 1756] but have made no public advances for fear of alarming the Nawab and the King of Tanjore. Do not expect that the King of Mysore will consent to the treaty. From what Lawrence and Palk reported in 1754, it is doubtful whether Venkata Rao's proposal was ever approved by the King of Tanjore. The Dalaway might perhaps have consented to pay 30 or 35 lakhs, which was then the amount of the Nawab's debt, but is unlikely to be willing to engage for the amount it has now risen to. But even if he were willing, it is doubtful whether so large a sum could be found owing to the contributions levied twice by the Marathas and once by Salabat Jang and as the civil wars which have raged there still continue.

20. *Ibid*, p. 76.

Have not heard anything from Venkata Rao since he left Madras. The Committee are endeavouring to ascertain the attitude of the Mysore Darbar and if there is the least chance of a treaty, will start negotiations without delay. Orme has agreed to undertake the management of the business and is at present in correspondence with Venkata Rao. . . "

Again, on February 28, 1757, they submitted : [21]

" Orme's secret negotiations [with Mysore] have not produced any result worth mentioning ... "

On November 11, 1757, the *Secret Committee* observed. [22]

" Recognize the difficulty of the Mysore negotiations, but it will be of great service if they can ever be brought to success. . . "

On October 5, 1758, the *Select Committee* reported : [23]

" Orme has received no answer to his letter to Venkata Rao, approved in Private Committee of February 1 . . ."

On January 23, 1759, however, the *Secret Committee* recorded and instructed: [24]

" Have read the minutes of the Private Committee, February 1, 1758, [missing] in which Orme reports receiving a letter from Venkata Rao of Mysore offering 30 lakhs of Rupees for the surrender of Trichinopoly, and stating that this is the utmost that the King of Mysore will give, and that a Vakil is being sent to Madras. Agree with the Madras Committee that this offer was not sincere and expect that little further progress has been made. However as the Nawab's debt is an object of the highest concern, no opportunity should be lost of getting as large a satisfaction for it as circumstances will permit. The orders of February 13, 1756, recognise that the Company's honour and interest are

21. *Ibid*, p. 91.
22. *Ibid*, p. 153.
23 *Ibid*, p. 169.
24. *Ibid*, pp. 191-192.

closely connected with the Nawab's credit and advantage. But if his affairs should be in such distress that our future support will rather increase than decrease his debt, he must consent to such terms as are most conducive to our interest, 'for although we are willing to aid and assist this our faithful but unfortunate ally, we must not sacrifice ourselves.' But no steps may be taken that will dishonour the English name. The Nawab should be convinced that the proposed measures are fair and reasonable; and the Committee are then at liberty to execute their own determinations in case he will not be reasonable. Trichinopoly 'being a stake of the last importance,' it should not be delivered up, except for a sum nearly adequate to the Nawab's debt; nor should the Committee engage to guarantee its possession to any one; nor again should it pass to the French or their allies. Under such conditions, 30 lakhs may be deemed a fair equivalent for it. Before any definite action is taken, the scheme must be approved by the Governor and Council....."

But, on March 13, 1761, they communicated to the President and the rest of the *Select Committee* at Fort St. George, thus: [25]

"We observe with pleasure your application and care to reduce the Nabob's immense debt; we much approve of what you have done in securing the revenues of Arcot. The Nabob ought to be sensible of the great distresses we are plunged into rather than sacrifice his interest and submit to bear his share of the inconveniences. The treaty formerly directed to be negotiated with the King of Mysore and Venkata Row we by no means approve aud absolutely revoke all power heretofore given you of compounding for Trichinopoly.

25. *Mily. Desp. from Court*, II. 25, Paras 10 and 11. See also *Mad. Desp.*, p. 257 (Summary).

"The Nabob's account should not be loaded with partial charges but a war with France does not, in our judgment, make any material difference. It enables us, with great assistance from government, to give him powerful and secure protection, and in peace we have been under the necessity of doing the same to the extent [of] our abilities; however this and many other points must be determined when we come to a final adjustment, and we certainly shall expect an equitable equivalent for interest on the vast sums of money for many years advanced and owing."

(9) COPY OF AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BY BAKSHI KRISHNAIYA OF MYSORE WITH NAWAB MUHAMMAD ALI WALAJAH, JUNE 1761.[26]

"I, Bany Krishnaya, Bakshey in the service of the Jagadavakar [King of Mysore], do give the following agreement:

"Whereas in order to punish Hyder Naick upon condition that an army of 1000 soldiers, 3000 seapoys, 200 troopers and 1000 black horse, 15 guns and 5 mortars, lead, gun powder and other necessary stores of war are sent from Nabob Aneverdy Cawn's court and the punishment of the said Hyder Naick is effected, I agree to pay ten lacks of Rupees to the Circar with the sum of 100,000 monthly for the charges of the above troops according to the particulars hereunder written. I shall deliver up the fort of Dindigal with its districts to the Circar and shall not demand the district of Caroor. When the above troops arrive for the assistance, they are not to molest the inhabitants of our villages and gadys in any respect whatsoever. I shall no ways deviate from this agreement. If the Circar acts contrary thereto, then this agreement is to be of no force. Thus I give this that it may be of service in time of need.

26. *Count. Corres.*, IX. p. 84, No. 142.

"Particulars of the troops: 1000 English soldiers one with another at 20 each per month. 3000 seapoys at 15 each per month. 200 Troopers at 35 per month. 1000 Black Horse at 30 per month. 20 guns and mortars at 500 per month."

(10) The Mahrattas in Mysore.

The story of the Mahrattas in Mysore has its origins in Vijayanagar times. Mahratta families, while they generally sought service under the neighbouring Shāhi States of Bijāpur, Gōlkoṇḍa and Ahmadnagar, seem to have been occasionally connected also, in some capacity or other, with the administration of the great Hindu Empire of Vijayanagar in its heyday (1336-1565). From a lithic record of Sadāśiva (1542-1570), dated in 1544[27], we learn that a Mahratta nobleman by name Viṭhalēśvaradēva-Mahā-Arasu was a Viceroy of his (*Śrīman Mahāmaṇḍalēśvara Śrī Marāteya Viṭhalēśvara Dēva Mahā-Arasu*) in the Śivanasamudra-sīme, and that his jurisdiction extended over Bangalore, where he was represented by an agent (*Kārya-karta.*)

On the fall of Vijayanagar (1565) and the shifting of the Imperial capital to Penukoṇḍa, direct connection of the Mahrattas with the Hindu Empire of the South almost ceased, and they found increasing opportunities of serving under their Muslim sovereigns (particularly of Bijāpur), and distinguishing themselves as civil and military officers for over one hundred years—a period which was marked in the main by the rapid decline of the Empire under the fourth or the Āravīḍu Dynasty, the gradual rise to prominence of the kingdom of Mysore under the Woḍeyars, and the systematic penetration into the Karnāṭak and far south of the arms of Bijāpur and Gōlkoṇḍa. The names of Shāhji, Mādāji, Vēdōji, Anantōji and Bālāji Haibat Rao, among others, loom

27. *E. C.*, IXBn. 30.

large in the history of this period as Mahratta officers taking an active part in the Karnāṭak expeditions under Muslim leaders.

To Shāhji (1594-1664), son of Mālōji Bhōnsle, however, definitely belongs the credit of having laid the foundations of the Mahratta power, and begun the first Mahratta settlement, in Mysore. Changing his allegiance alternately to Ahmadnagar, Bijāpur and the Mughal Emperor, that remarkable man, ultimately in 1632, went over to the Adil Shah of Bijāpur. In 1637-1638, he accompanied Raṇadullā Khān on his invasion of the Karnātak and about the close of 1638 was placed in charge of Bangalore, taken from Immaḍi Kempe-Gauḍa of Māgaḍi (1569-1655). During the next twenty-five years—interrupted by a short interval of his arrest and imprisonment at Bijāpur (in 1649-1650), Shāhji, while ostensibly attached to the interests of his master, the Bijāpur Sultān, gradually extended his sway over parts of Bangalore and Kōlār districts, ruling them in an independent capacity assisted by Mahratta Brāhmans as officials, and maintaining unimpaired the Hindu traditions of government in the conquered tracts.[28] Meantime, about the middle of 1654, the wars of Bijāpur and Gōlkoṇḍa in the Karnāṭak were practically over, the two powers finally accomplishing the division of their conquests in 1656. The Bijāpur-belt of territory to the north of the kingdom of Mysore, under the arrangement effected, went by the designation of *Karnāṭak-Bijāpur-Bālaghāṭ*, while the territory below the Ghāṭs, almost coterminous with the south-eastern frontier of Mysore, by the designation of *Karnāṭak-Bijāpur-Pāyanghāṭ*. Shāhji was continued in charge of the entire tract, being confirmed in the possessions of Bangalore, Hoskōṭe, Kōlār, Doḍballāpur and Sīra as his *Jahgīr*. These

28. *Vide* inscriptions of Shāhji's time, cited below

developments tended to increase the power and prestige of Shāhji locally and we find him in 1657[29] referring to himself as *Ajaraka Khān Mahārāja Rājaśrī Sāhujīrājā Sāheb.* With Bangalore, the head-quarters of the *Jahgīr*, as the base of his power in the South and his ancestral fiefs of Poona and Supa in the distant north under his second son Śivāji (the eldest Sambhāji I having died in 1653), Shāhji, in the service of Bijāpur, continued his warlike activities in the Karnāṭak till his own accidental death at Basavāpaṭṇa in January 1664.[30]

Thereupon Ēkōji (Venkōji), son of Shāhji by his second wife Tukā Bāi Mōhite, stepped into the Mahratta inheritance in Mysore. Indeed there is evidence[31] of Ēkōji having succeeded to the patrimony as early as 1662, if not 1664. Evidently Shāhji already during his lifetime had nominated him to the *Jahgir.* Theoretically exercising the powers of a Bijāpur general, Ēkōji stayed in Bangalore till his conquest of Tanjore from the Nāyaka family, and his eventual usurpation of all sovereign authority there in 1675. From hence he threw off his allegiance to Bijāpur, and Tanjore became his head-quarters. Ēkōji's conquest of Tanjore, though a distinct loss to Bijāpur, was a landmark of considerable significance from the Mahratta point of view. With Bangalore as the nucleus of his power, it meant the first step in the advance of the Mahrattas in South India at

29. *E. C.*, IX Nl. 69.

30. Shāhji, when he died at Basavāpaṭṇa in January 1664, possessed the fort of Ārni, Porto Novo and the territory of Tanjore. He continued in obedience to Adil Shah who allowed him to retain his acquisitions (Duff, *Mahrattas*, I. 156). In March 1677, Śivāji marched southwards. After reaching Trivadi, Śivāji came to Vellore, which had surrendered previous to his arrival. Carnatic gurh and two other places—Jagadēvagarh and Mahārājagarh—were reduced. *Vēdō Bhāskar*—a Brāhman who had been in charge of Ārṇi since Shāhji's days—brought up the keys of the fort and tendered his services to Śivāji, by whom he was continued in his command and his two sons taken into the service (*Ibid*, 218). The story of the Ārṇi Jaghir remains yet to be written

31. *Ibid*, XSd. 47.

just the time when Bijāpur and Gōlkoṇḍa, hard pressed by the Mughals and the Mahrattas (under Śivāji) in the Deccan, had to retire homeward, leaving their Karnāṭak possessions under their deputies to their own fate.

Even after his conquest of Tanjore, Ēkōji continued to maintain a foothold on the distant *Jahgīr* of Bangalore, while the Mahratta arms under him gradually went about establishing themselves on the frontiers of the growing kingdom of Mysore and proceeded as far as Trichinopoly by 1676. Ēkōji's government of Tanjore since 1675, however, had been far from satisfactory, and this eventually led to Raghunath-Pant, the able confidential minister of Shāhji—then in charge of Ēkōji's heritage in Mysore—organising an expedition to the Karnāṭak under the rising power of Śivāji (half-brother of Ēkōji) from the Deccan in 1677, with a view to securing the kingdom of Tanjore, and perhaps the sovereignty of the entire South, to him. The expedition, while it was on the whole attended with success, left Ēkōji practically master of Tanjore and Śivāji after passing through his ancestral possessions in Mysore returned to the Deccan about April 1678. Incidentally, Śivāji's invasion of the Karnāṭak left the sovereignty ot the kingdom of Mysore undisturbed, his progress in that direction in August 1677 (during his march from Gingee) having been definitely arrested by her then ruler, Chikkadēvarāja Woḍeyar (1673-1704), who, as the natural heir and successor of the Vijayanagar Empire, had asserted his claim to rule from the throne of the Karnāṭaka country as early as 1675, under the titles *Karnāṭaka-Chakravarti* and *Dakshiṇadik-Chakravarti*.

Mahratta sovereignty in the South, however, tended rapidly to assume a definite shape in the wake of Śivāji's expedition to the Karnāṭak, and more particularly after his death in April 1680. Of that sovereignty, extension of Mahratta power and influence over the length and

breadth of South India, and the establishment of outposts at convenient points, which would enable them to levy and realise their dues (the *Chauth* and *Sardēśmukhi*) from the conquered tracts, were the prime features. Already by 1678 the Mahrattas had been reckoned a force in South India. Besides Bangalore, Gingee, Vellore and Tanjore had become the strongholds of the Mahrattas there. And between 1678-1680 they were extending the sphere of their activities from the Karnāṭak-Bijāpur-Bālghāṭ in the north up to Trichinopoly in the far south. Further, in keeping with the theory of Mahratta sovereignty, we find[32] Sambhāji II, son and successor of Śivāji, assuming the title of Emperor (*Sambhōji Chakravarti*) for the first time in July 1680.

In the realization of their ambition, however, the Mahrattas, during 1680-1686, found themselves drawn into an inevitable conflict with Chikkadēvarāja Woḍeyar of Mysore, who, as the sole representative of the Vijayanagar Empire in South India, had been since 1673 systematically extending the frontiers of his kingdom at the expense of Madura in the far south and Bijāpur in the north, and in 1682 laid siege to Trichinopoly itself, the objective of southern expansion of Mysore ever since 1642. In that conflict, the Mahrattas, though at first they sustained serious reverses in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam during a diversion of their forces from Trichinopoly in 1682, eventually came out successful, and were in July 1686 obliged to come to terms with Mysore and retire from the south, hard pressed in their homelands by the advance of the Mughal arms on the Deccan.

The withdrawal of the Mahrattas was followed by the fall of Bijāpur (September 1686), the influx of the Mughals into South India and the rapid recovery by

32. *Ibid*, Mb. 117.

Chikkadēvarāja Woḍeyar from the effects of the Mahratta wars in Mysore. These circumstances doubtless told heavily on Ēkōji, who found it exceedingly difficult and expensive to maintain Bangalore, the seat of his father's *Jahgīr* in Mysore, from distant Tanjore. Accordingly, early in 1687, he managed to sell it through his *vakīl* to Chikkadēvarāja Woḍeyar for rupees three lakhs. The place finally passed into the possession of Mysore on July 14, 1687, after nearly fifty years of Mahratta sway there.

Mahratta connection with portions of Bangalore, Kolar and Tumkur districts—which originally formed part of Shāhji's *jahgīr*—however, continued during the closing years of the seventeenth century (1687-1700) and a greater part of the eighteenth, down to 1761. Mahratta armies and irregulars freely passed through these tracts during their struggles with the Mughals in the Karnāṭak (1689-1698). Again, during the renewed bid for supremacy in the South in the eighteenth century (*c.* 1720-1761), these tracts, with their well-garrisoned outposts, formed the base of operations of the Pēshwas against the kingdom of Mysore and other rivals (like the Nizām and the Nawābs of Arcot) as far as Trichinopoly, and provided a fertile ground for their systematic collection of the *Chauth* and *Sardēśmukhi* in the Karnāṭak and the realisation of Pēshwa Bālāji Bāji Rao's (1740-1761) grand ideal of Hindu Empire (*Hindu-pād-Pādshāhi*). The soaring ambition of Bālāji Rao was unluckily frustrated by the last battle of Pāṇipat (1761), when under the stress of necessity he had to recall his reserve forces from Mysore for the service of his country and nation; and this contributed not a little to complete the usurpation by Haidar Alī of Mysore, followed by his acquisition of Mahratta outposts in rapid succession. Mahratta power in Mysore thus ended as fortuitiously as it had begun, though they never ceased to have an

eye on the kingdom, and sought to maintain diplomatic relations with the court of Seringapatam throughout the regime of Haidar and Tipū (1761-1799); while individual Mahrattas had increasing opportunities for distinguishing themselves as civil and military officers in the State during the period of Restoration and after—from 1799 onwards—a period marked by the decline and fall of the Mahratta Empire in India.

Memorials of Mahratta sway in Mysore extend over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These are invariably lithic inscriptions in Kannaḍa and come from parts of Bangalore, Channapaṭṇa, Hoskōṭe, Nelamangala, Doḍballāpur, Kōlār, Mulbāgal, Chintāmaṇi, Śrīnivāsapur, Bāgepalli, Madhugiri and Channagiri taluks. They bear out in an ample measure that the Mahratta domination over this area was something more than its mere temporary occupation by an alien power, and indicate to some extent that it was closely bound up with the well-being of the local populace with whom they had to come into intimate contact in everyday life.

The earliest of these documents, dated November 3, 1637,[33] records the grant of a rent-free land in Hasugūr by the *Śrīmanta*, the *Dēśakulakarṇi* Śāmaṇṇa. The next series of records belong to the time of Shāhji and range from 1647 to 1663. One of these, dated September 29, 1657,[34] registers his gift of lands in Lakkūr (Nelamangala taluk) to Bāvanūr Ahammad, for his own merit. Another, dated January 12, 1660,[35] refers to his grant of the village of Nāguvaḷḷi, in Channapaṭṇa-sthala, as a rent-free estate to Siddaliṅge Gauḍa. A third, dated October 5, 1660,[36] records a gift of land to Antrāji-Paṇḍita (a Mahratta Brāhman official under Shāhji). A

33. *E.C.*, XSd. 49: *Iśvara, Kārtika ba. 12.*
34. *Ibid*, IX Nl. 69: *Hēviḷambi, Āśvīja śu. 2.*
35. *Ibid*, Cp. 26: *Vikāri, Māgha śu. 10.*
36. *Ibid*, XKl. 176: *Śārvari, Āśvīja śu. 12.*

fourth, dated September 1, 1661,[37] relates to a grant of dry fields of the sowing capacity of 100½ *Khaṇḍugas* to Byalisi Javiraṇṇa. And a fifth, dated May 1, 1663,[38] registers a gift of land yielding 6 *Khaṇḍugas* of paddy to one Alambigiri Tippa Seṭṭi for having caused the old tank of Hōlūr belonging to Kōlār restored. Again, one of the records, dated March 3, 1647,[39] relates to a grant by Sambhāji I (eldest son of Shāhji) of the village of Hanchipur to Channabasappa Waḍēr of the Saji-Maṭha. Another, dated November 5, 1653,[40] refers to the rent-free gift (*Kaṭṭu-Koḍige*) of the village Koṇḍiganahaḷḷi by Kanayāja Paṇḍit, agent of Sambhāji for the border district of Kōlār-sīme. A third, dated October 20, 1654,[41] relates to a grant by the same official of land under the Muduvāḍi-Mallasamudra tank to Chandaya Tambarahaḷḷi Dêpê-Gauḍa for having constructed the tank. A fourth, dated August 16, 1661,[42] records the construction of a pillar for the service of God Venkaṭêśvara of the Bêvūr hill, in the Maḷūr hōbḷi of Channapaṭṇa-sthaḷa, by Duṇḍōji Haibat Rao (son of Bālāji Haibat Rao), another official under Shāhji. And a fifth, dated March 14, 1662,[43] refers to the gift of a rent-free land (*nettaru-Koḍige*) by Bāranāji Rāja, *Havāldār* of Rahadurga under Shāhji, in honour of Sīmangala Chikka-Dēvā's son Timmappa (who fell, perhaps, in a battle). We have, again, a record of Ēkōji's time, dated January 20, 1666,[44] in which Jayitā Bāi (? daughter-in-law of Shāhji) makes a grant of the Uttūr village in the Kōlār-sīme (belonging to Kōlār-chāvaḍi) as an *agrahāra* to one

37. *M.A.R.* 1923, P. 45, No. 10: *Plava, Bhādrapada ba.* 3.
38. *E.C.*, XKl, 219: *Śōbhakrit, Vaiśākha śu.* 5.
39. *Ibid*, IXDb. 28: *Vyaya, Phālguṇa śu.* 7.
40. *Ibid*, XMb. 154: *Vijaya, Kārtika ba.* 11.
41. *Ibid*, Kl. 193: *Jaya, Āśvīja ba.* 5.
42. *Ibid*, IX Cp. 68: *Plava, Bhādrapada śu.* 2.
43. *Ibid*, X Sd. 47: *Śubhakrit, Chaitra śu.* 5.
44. *Ibid*, Kl. 227: *Viśvāvasu, Pushya ba.* 10.

Bhāvūji-Pant, son of Virūpāksha-Śankara of Kāśyapa-Gōtra. Another, dated in 1669,[45] inscribed on the rock to the south of the Mallēśvara temple, Bangalore, registers the grant by Ēkōji, on the application of the "*Mahānāḍu*" of Bangalore (*Bengaḷūru*), of the village of Mēdara-Ninganahaḷḷi as a *mānya* for the God Mallikārjuna of Mallāpura (now *Mallēśwaram*). Among the records of the time of Sambhāji II (son of Śivāji), one, dated July 31, 1680,[46] communicates an order (*nirūpa*) of his to the *Kārukūn* of Kōlār regarding the gift to one Venkaṭēśa Śāstri, son of Chenni Bhaṭṭa, of the village Uttanūr-Maḍavāla with all rights. Another, dated January 29, 1685,[47] relates to the grant of a plot of land of the sowing capacity of half a *Khaṇḍuga* in the Agrahār village, Hoskōṭe taluk, for the worship of God Mādēśvara, by Dēvaiya Nāyak. And a third, dated January 4, 1686,[48] registers the gift by Malukōji (? son of Sambhāji) of the village of Avalambagiri (Alamgiri), in the Kaivāra-sthaḷa of the Kōlār-sīme, for services to God Tiruvengalanātha.

Among the epigraphs of the eighteenth century, one, dated in April 1727,[49] refers to the grant by Manukōji-Rāja of land to Haḍakanahaḷḷi Baira-Gauḍa as a rent-free estate. Two documents, dated January 15, 1728,[50] relate to a gift by Aṇṇāji to Śēshō-Pant for having built a big tank in front of Suḷibele, Hoskōṭe taluk. A fourth, dated January 10, 1740,[51] records a grant by Subēdār Yaṇṭāji-Basale to Mari-Gauḍa for a similar service in front of Dāsērahaḷḷi, near Vokkalēri, Kōlār taluk. A

45. *M.A.R.*, 1909, P. 25, Para 97: *Saumya*. The village granted is to be identified with Myādarahaḷḷi in the Yaśvantpur hōbḷi of the Bangalore taluk (see *List of Villages*, 2).
46. *E.C.*, X Mb. 117: *Raudri, Śrāvaṇa śu.* 15.
47. *M.A.R.*, 1925, P. 27, No. 16: *Raktākshi, Māgha śu.* 5.
48. *E.C.*, X Ct. 54: *Krōdhana, Pushya ba.* 5.
49. *Ibid*, IX Ht. 46: *Plavanga, Vaiśākha ba.* ?
50. *Ibid*, Ht. 53 and 55: *Plavanga, Māgha śu.* 15.
51. *Ibid*, X Kl. 63 (*bis*): *Siddhārthi, Pushya ba.* 7.

fifth, dated August 28, 1758,[52] refers to a grant by the Śrīmanta Sāhib (Pēshwa Bālāji Bāji Rao) with the Sār-Jāmīndār, in the presence of the Seṭṭis of the Sāgar-Pēṭē of Basavāpaṭṇa, to Marilingappa for the office of a *Seṭṭi*, as a *Pālaki-Umbaḷi*, of the village of Uḍova belonging to Kole in the Sūḷekere-sime. We have also documents dated in 1767,[53] and 1775,[54] registering gifts by Malhāri Rao, Mādhava Rao Ballāḷ Pradhān and Murāri Rao-Ghōrpaḍe.

Most of the Mahrattas resident in the State to-day are descendants of those who have followed in the wake of Mahratta incursions since 1565 A.D.,[55] barring those who might have followed the religious leaders belonging to the organized Mutts of Śankara and Madhva between the 14th and 16th centuries. During the period of the earlier Mysore kings, individual Mahrattas—mostly Brāhmans—served in the higher offices of the State. Khaṇḍē Rao, who opposed Haidar in his usurpation of sovereign power in the State, was one such. He was a trusted minister of King Krishṇarāja II. Tōshikhāne Krishṇa Rao, who led the insurrection against Tipū, was the faithful treasury officer of the reigning sovereign. Bishṭōpanth-Bādāmi—the "Bisnapah Pandit" of the *Wellington Despatches*—who commanded the army in the earlier years of the post-Restoration period, was another Mahratta Brāhman whose services were much

52. *Ibid*, VII (1) Ci. 51: *Ś.* 1680, *Bahudhānya*, *Śrāvaṇa ba.* 10. *Pālaki-Umbaḷi*: A rent-free gift for the dignity attached to a person of being conveyed in a palankeen.

53. *Ibid*, X Sp. 77, XII Mi. 23-24: *Sarvajit*.

54. *Ibid*, Bg. 45: *Manmatha*.

55. A series of documents in Marathi and Persian, from Dodballāpur, belonging to the 17th and 18th centuries, in the possession of one of these families—the family of *Sardeshpāṇḍe* Madhava Rao, B.A., B.E., of the Mysore P. W. D.,—have been described in a note in the *Proceedings of The Indian Historical Records Commission*, Vol. XVIII (1942), pp. 269-279. These documents are found to throw a flood of interesting light on the provincial administration of the Karnātic-Bālaghāt during the period.

appreciated by H. H. Śrī Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar III and the British. When Bāji Rao II fell in 1818 and the Pēshwa's territories were annexed, a number of Mahratta families dependent on him emigrated and sought shelter in Mysore. Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar III not only gave them asylum but also afforded opportunities for service under him. The continued effect of the influence wielded by these Mahratta families in the State has been the spread of Marāthi language as the language of administration at one time and the spread of Mahratta culture which made active service for the good of the State its primary duty. Whether in the higher administrative or the military walks of life, the Mahrattas have always distinguished themselves by their zeal, hard work, and infinite capacity for taking pains in the interests of common good. Politically they have been in the forefront, their sagacity, alertness and adaptability being well known. At present the Mahrattas in the Mysore State number about 53,000, but this figure does not include Mahratta Brāhmans. They are to be found scattered through the eight districts of the State, but more largely in the Shimoga, Kōlār and Bangalore districts. The Marāthi language is spoken by about 50,000, a number of the Mahratta families having taken to Kannaḍa under local influences. A good part of the Mysore Army—part of the Indian Army of to-day—is manned by the Mahrattas who have always supplied recruits for it. Among the officers are a number of Brāhmans of Mahratta origin, most of whom can trace their descent back to ancestors who won distinction centuries ago in the service of the Mysore kings.